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Anselmo v. Bisbee, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 45 (Jun. 29, 2017)1 
CRIMINAL LAW: DUE PROCESS 
Summary 
 The Nevada Parole Board can deny parole for any reason authorized by regulation or 
statute. However, inmates do have a statutory right to have a parole hearing under NRS 213.140(1). 
Therefore, in limited cases where the Nevada Parole Board clearly misapplied its own internal 
guidelines in assessing whether to grant parole to an inmate, a new parole hearing is warranted.  
 
Background 
 Appellant, Michael P. Anselmo, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole in 1972. He was subsequently convicted for escape on two 
occasions in 1976 and 1977. Each escape conviction added a consecutive ten years to Anselmo’s 
life sentence. For the next twenty years, however, Anselmo became a model prisoner. So, in 2006, 
the Pardons Board commuted his sentence to life with the possibility of parole. After this, Anselmo 
appeared before the Parole Board on three separate occasions between 2006 and 2012. He was 
denied parole primarily due to the seriousness of his underlying offense.  
 On November 17, 2014, the parole hearing at issue, the Parole Board gave his Parole Risk 
Assessment. The Assessment found that Anselmo had a low risk for committing a subsequent 
offense, but that his original offense (murder) had the highest severity level. These designations 
directed the board to consider aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether parole was 
appropriate. 
During the hearing, three members recommended granting parole. However, the remaining 
four members voted to deny parole because the nature of Anselmo’s criminal record was 
“increasingly more serious” and because of the potential impact on the community. Anselmo filed 
for reconsideration, which was denied.  
 Anselmo argued that he is entitled to a new parole hearing because the parole board based 
their decision on an immutable characteristic, the nature of his original crime. Furthermore, 
Anselmo argued that the board did not follow their own internal guidelines in his assessment.  
 
Discussion 
The Board may deny parole for any reason authorized by statute 
 Anselmo first argued that the Court should emulate the California Supreme Court’s In re 
Lawrence decision.2 In Lawrence, the California Supreme Court found that the egregiousness of 
an inmate’s original offense can only be a factor if the Parole Board also finds that the inmate 
poses a current threat to public safety. In other words, when there is no evidence that an inmate 
poses a threat to public safety, the Board cannot then deny his parole based on the immutable 
characteristic of his original crime.3 By doing so, the Parole Board denies the inmate’s due process 
and statutory rights.  
                                                          
1  By Marco Luna 
2  In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535 (Cal. 2008). 
3  Id. at 564. 
 The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this argument because California statutes regarding 
Parolees are considerably different than those in Nevada. For example, in California, the Parole 
Board “must grant parole unless it determines that public safety requires a lengthier period of 
incarceration for the individual because of the gravity of the offense underlying the conviction.”4 
Based on that specific language, the California Supreme Court found that “California inmates have 
a due process right in the grant of parole, such that a decision to deny parole is subject to judicial 
review.”5  
Conversely, Nevada statutes do not give any due process rights in the grant of parole to 
Nevada inmates. Therefore, unlike California courts, the Court here will not review the evidence 
supporting the Parole Board’s decision. This finding was based on NRS 213.1099(2)(c) and 
213.10885(2)(a), which state that the Parole Board “shall” consider the seriousness of the 
underlying offense in determining whether to grant or deny parole.6 Therefore, because Nevada 
law clearly allows a parole denial based on the severity of the crime committed, the Court here 
could not grant the Writ Mandamus based on statutory grounds. 
  
The Board must follow its internal guidelines 
 
 Anselmo also argued that the Board did not follow its own internal guidelines when it noted 
that the nature of his criminal record was “increasingly more serious.” The Court agreed. 
Anselmo’s parole denial was based on the aggravating factor: “[n]ature of criminal record is 
increasingly more serious.”7 The Court followed the internal guidelines for the Division of Parole 
and Probation, which state, “if the person is now serving a sentence of life, or Murder/Sexual 
Assault, don’t use this as the person has already committed the most serious of crimes.”8 Based on 
this clear language, the Court found that this aggravating factor should not have been applied to 
Anselmo. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Court found that even though the Nevada the statutory scheme allows the Parole Board 
to deny parole for any reason, inmates still had a statutory right to be considered for parole under 
NRS 213.140(1). So, considering NRS 213.140(1) with the case at bar, where the Board 
misapplied its own guidelines, the Court found that extraordinary relief is necessary in this 
instance. Therefore, the Court granted Anselmo’s Writ of Mandamus and instructed the Board to 
vacate its November 17, 2014 denial of parole and conduct a new parole hearing where NAC 
213.518(2)(k) is not applied.  
                                                          
4  Id. at 547. 
5  See In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 205 (Cal. 2002). 
6  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 213.1099(2)(c), 213.10885(2)(a) (2015). 
7  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 213.518(2)(k) (amended 2017). 
8  Nevada Parole Guidelines Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Definitions, 
http://parole.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/parolenvgov/content/Information/Aggravating_and_Mitigating_Factors_Definiti
ons.pdf. 
